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Feedback and behaviour of students
Using feedback (in education):
• helps to build human capital / signal ability through achievement
• fosters positive behaviour, e.g. lead a healthy and safe life (in students)
Sharp increase in interest in the role of education and students’ behaviour:
• ”No Child Left Behind” (14bln $) by the US Department of Education
• ”Every child matters” (5-15bln £) by the UK Department of Children, School
and Family (DCSF)
Contribution and findings
• Can noisy feedback affect on behaviour? What’s the story?
• Substitution and income effects help to explain behaviour, e.g. police warnings
and bullying, of students in secondary schools in England
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News coverage on compulsory education in the UK
More parents teach their children at home, Guardian 2nd February 2005
• 20000 families took their children out of school in the past 12 months
• Bullying is the main concern of families opting out of mainstream education
Young pupils fuel record truancy, BCC 26th February 2009
• Unauthorised absence in primary schools was up from 0.52% to 0.57%
• 5% of all enrolments in secondary schools are classed as persistent absentees
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Institutional setting: the British national school curriculum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Stage Year Assessment Expected achievement
level
3-4 Early Years
4-5 Reception
5-6 Key Stage 1 1
6-7 2 Teacher assessments 2
in English, Maths
and Science (EMS)
7-8 Key Stage 2 3
8-9 4
9-10 5
10-11 6 National and teacher 4
assessments in EMS
11-12 Key Stage 3 7 Teacher assessments
12-13 8 Teacher assessments
13-14 9 National and teacher 5 or 6
assessments in EMS and
foundation subjects
14-15 Key Stage 4 10 Some children take GCSEs
15-16 11 Most children take GCSEs or
other national qualifications
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Toy model of effort, leisure, behaviour and feedback
Name Quantity Price
Effort e Ability a
Leisure l 1 (unity)
Behaviour b Probability
of punishment p
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Toy model of effort, leisure, behaviour and feedback (cont.d)
max
e,b
u(y, l) (1)
s.t. y = f (ea, pb− (1− p)b) and e + l + b ≤ T
f ′eu′e − u′l = 0, MRSl,e = f ′e (2)
f ′bu
′
b − u′l = 0, MRSl,b = f ′b (3)
...MRSb,e =
f ′e
f ′b
(4)
then
db
da
= substitution effect + income effect Q 0? (5)
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Distribution of test scores and cutoffs determining achievement level
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Construction of total score, synthetic cutoffs & McCrary’s test
2-3 3-4 4-5
cutoffs English 29 50 70
t-test 5.73 18.79 23.28
cutoffs Maths 22 49 79
t-test 6.03 9.72 10.99
cutoffs Science 18 39 65
t-test 3.23 10.53 19.51
cutoffs total score 69 138 214
t-test 2.48 4.87 4.82
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Institutional setting: grading of Key Stage 2 tests
Teachers are not involved in grading their students’ test scripts
KS tests are marked anonymously by national curriculum tests markers using a
scale 0-100+
Students and parents get the
• discrete teacher assessment levels that the child has achieved
• average achievement level
– for all the children in a child’s age group in the same school
– in the previous year in England
Grading systems and tables are hardly manipulable as they are periodically reviewed
jointly by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
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Summary statistics by total achievement level
Achievement English English English Maths Maths Maths Science Science Science
level ≤ 3 = 4 > 4 ≤ 3 = 4 > 4 ≤ 3 = 4 > 4
2 0.34 0.00 0.66 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.77 0.02 0.22
3 0.74 0.21 0.05 0.86 0.06 0.08 0.45 0.54 0.00
4 0.11 0.73 0.15 0.15 0.76 0.08 0.01 0.78 0.21
5 0.04 0.02 0.93 0.08 0.03 0.89 0.08 0.08 0.85
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Summary statistics
Mean StdDev
Police warning in wave 1 0.06 .
Bullying episosed in wave 1 0.30 .
Ever truant in wave 1 0.13 .
Ever smoked cigarettes in wave 1 0.08 .
Ever tried alcohol in wave 1 0.39 .
Ever smoked cannabis in wave 1 0.07 .
Vandalism episodes in wave 1 0.25 .
White 0.59 .
Black 0.07 .
Asian 0.17 .
Other 0.06 .
SEN statement 0.03 .
SEN non-statemented 0.14 .
Free school meals 0.18 .
English additional language 0.28 .
Voluntary aided schools 0.16 .
Voluntary controlled schools 0.08 .
Other schools 0.02 .
Community schools 0.64 .
Key stage 2 total score 178.91 43.34
Key stage 2 English score 59.37 14.23
Key stage 2 Maths score 61.72 20.92
Key stage 2 Science score 56.58 13.20
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Timescale of Key Stage 2 tests and behaviour of students
-
Key Stage 2
tests
May
2001
Key Stage 2
results
July
2001
Students’
behaviour
March 2003 -
October 2003
Key Stage 3
tests
May
2004
Key Stage 3
results
July
2004
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Illustration of the research design
Key Stage 2 score
-
?
-
Key Stage 2 achievement level
-
Behaviour
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Research design
B∗i = α + βAi + Ui
B =
{
1 if B∗ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(6)
Bi = α + βAi + Ui (7)
B∗ is latent continuous measure of behaviour
B equals 1 in the event of e.g. police warning if B∗ ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise
A is binary achievement level, e.g. pass/fail; unobservables may correlate with A
and B, e.g. parental guidance
S is a continuous test score underlying A and S¯ is an administrative cutoff in S
β < (>) 0: does substitution income effect dominate? between what activities?
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Results: dependent variable police warning
OLS RD
cutoff 3-4 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.016∗ 0.019∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016 0.020
S.d. (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.015) (0.019)
AIC 349.3 33.0 -305.3 -546.0 -552.3 -549.3
cutoff 4-5 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.015∗ 0.0091 0.0060
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.010) (0.013)
AIC 350.0 12.7 -302.6 -543.1 -551.1 -547.5
Covariates N Y N Y Y Y
Higher order N N N 2nd 3rd
N 14183 14183 13298 13298 13298 13298
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Results: dependent variable bullying
OLS RD
cutoff 3-4 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ 0.026 0.033∗ 0.017 -0.030
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.033)
AIC 18772.9 17829.4 17442.1 16595.0 16595.4 16589.9
cutoff 4-5 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.044
(0.0090) (0.0085) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.027)
AIC 18767.6 17797.2 17436.2 16586.9 16588.7 16591.6
Covariates N Y N Y Y Y
Higher order N N N 2nd 3rd
N 14183 14183 13298 13298 13298 13298
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Results: dependent variable truancy
OLS RD
cutoff 3-4 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.016 0.028∗ 0.032∗∗ -0.012 -0.0041
(0.0087) (0.0094) (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.028)
AIC 10169.5 9981.5 9108.8 8990.0 8985.0 8988.4
cutoff 4-5 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.015
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.015) (0.019)
AIC 10155.9 9955.3 9101.1 8979.7 8982.8 8986.3
Covariates N Y N Y Y Y
Higher order N N N 2nd 3rd
N 14183 14183 13298 13298 13298 13298
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Results: dependent variable vandalism
OLS RD
cutoff 3-4 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.027∗ 0.030∗ 0.032∗ -0.054∗ -0.045
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.033)
AIC 17327.7 17035.3 16155.5 15908.1 15871.4 15874.9
cutoff 4-5 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.037
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026)
AIC 10155.9 9955.3 9101.1 8979.7 8982.8 8986.3
Covariates N Y N Y Y Y
Higher order N N N 2nd 3rd
N 14183 14183 13298 13298 13298 13298
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Robustness checks: pre-treatment covariates, cutoff 3-4
OLS coeff. S.e.
Black .09 (.10)
Asian -.10 (.13)
Other .06 (.05)
SEN statement .01 (.05)
SEN non-statemented .32 (.13)∗∗
Free school meals .01 (.13)
English additional language -.09 (.13)
Voluntary aided schools .05 (.11)
Voluntary controlled schools 0.08 (.10)
Community school .02 (.02)
19
Robustness checks: gaming around cutoffs
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Squaring interpretation of estimates with theory
6
-
test score
βRD < 0
cutoff 3-4
noise< 0
a < ˆa3−4
noise> 0
a > ˆa2−3
6
-
test score
βRD > 0
cutoff 3-4
noise< 0
a < ˆa3−4
noise> 0
a > ˆa2−3
βRD < 0 βRD > 0
income effect dominates if noise<0 substitution effect dominates if noise<0
substitution effect dominates if noise>0 income effect dominates if noise>0
Under the ceteris paribus assumption that leisure is unchanged
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Discussion
• OLS is mostly downward biased w.r.t. RD
• No effect at policy-relevant score cutoff 3-4 can be due to gaming and/or sub-
stitution and income effects netting off
• Negative effect at cutoff 4-5 suggests that substitution (income) effect domi-
nates for students with a > (<)a¯
• I extend the results in Azmat and Iriberri (2009) and Bandiera et al. (2009) by
identifying the effect of feedback beyond test scores and reconciling with theory
• Novel application on feedback in test scores and behaviour to the work on
– non-market outcomes in Grossman (2005) a Gaviria and Raphael (2001)
– confidence and motivation in Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2003)
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Next steps
• Longitudinal data on test scores and behaviour
• Effect on achievement in the school leaving age exam (GCSE) and beyond: A-
level, enrollment at college and degree choice
• Timing of recording of information in the survey data and administrative data
•Multiple cutoffs: incentives and RD
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